But whether philosophers shall think fit to CALL a thing the SAME or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. But, if the term SAME be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing. Words are of arbitrary imposition and, since men are used to apply the word SAME where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, SEVERAL SAW THE SAME THING, so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things.
If the term SAME be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different persons may perceive the same thing or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. But the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other mind.ĭoes it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same thing? And is not this highly, absurd? Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds? I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it has led me into another. In opposition to sceptics and atheists George Berkeley (1685-1753) George Berkeley Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,
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